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Abstract:  
Because SARS-Cov-2 (COVID-19) statistics affect economic policies and political 
outcomes, governments have an incentive to control them. Manipulation may be less likely in 
democracies, which have checks to ensure transparency. We show that data on disease burden 
bear indicia of data modification by authoritarian governments relative to democratic 
governments. First, data on COVID-19 cases and deaths from authoritarian governments show 
significantly less variation from a 7 day moving average. Because governments have no reason 
to add noise to data, lower deviation is evidence that data may be massaged. Second, data on 
COVID-19 deaths from authoritarian governments do not follow Benford’s law, which describes 
the distribution of leading digits of numbers. Deviations from this law are used to test for 
accounting fraud. Smoothing and adjustments to COVID-19 data may indicate other alterations 
to these data and a need to account for such alterations when tracking the disease. 
 
Main text:  
The World Health Organization declared SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) a pandemic on 
March 11, 2020. As of June 30, there have been more than ten million cases and in excess of five 
hundred thousand COVID-19 deaths1. One feature that makes COVID-19 unique among recent 
epidemics is the excessive burden of the disease in democratic countries. Using the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) 2019 Democracy Index2, which classifies governments into four 
regimes (authoritarian, hybrid, flawed democracy, and full democracy), we find that although 
democracies account for 48% of the world’s population, they account for approximately 75% 
and 89% of total cases and deaths, respectively. Figure 1 compares COVID-19 burden per 
million people across regimes through June 30. For authoritarian regimes the median value of 
cumulative cases per million people was 324 (Interquartile range [IQR]; 56-1529), whereas for 
full democracies it was 2896 (IQR; 1308-5222). Comparing cumulative deaths per million 
people; for authoritarian regimes the median value was 8.6 (IQR; 0.9-29.3), while for full 
democracies the median was 130.8 (IQR; 28.4-355.9). Moreover, the growth in cases and deaths 
is more pronounced in democratic regimes, in particular, full democracies, as compared to other 
regimes. Likewise, the case fatality rate (ratio of COVID-19 deaths to total cases) has risen faster 
in full democracies. Indeed, the CFR has declined in authoritarian regimes since late March 
(Figure S1).  
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There are several possible explanations for the high burden in democracies. First, 
democracies are on an average richer (higher per capita income and health expenditure as a 
percentage of gross domestic product) than other regimes. They can afford more tests, resulting 
in higher case and death counts. Second, democracies are more open to travel and trade. This 
facilitates the spread of COVID-19 across borders. Third, democracies may, idiosyncratically, 
have a larger elderly population, which is more vulnerable to COVID-19. Fourth, most 
democratic countries are north of 40° latitude. Fifth, perhaps authoritarian regimes have greater 
control over their population. They may be better able to enforce social distancing and limit 
mobility, both of which reduce spread of the disease.  
These explanations presume that the data on COVID-19 burden are reliable. However, 
the press has raised questions about the credibility of COVID-19 data reported by countries. 
Stories regarding data manipulation have emerged for China 3, Iran 4, Indonesia 5, and the US 6. 
Therefore, it is important statistically to investigate the reliability of COVID-19 data that is being 
reported across regimes.  
In democracies, with freedom of the press, separation of power, and an active opposition, 
there may exist checks and balances that prevent governments from manipulating the data. 
Authoritarian regimes have greater latitude to manipulate data. Such governments have been 
criticized, however, for manipulating other types of data 7-10. These governments have an 
incentive to use information as a form of social control 11-15.  
Here we show evidence of manipulation of COVID-19 data by authoritarian regimes 
relative to democratic regimes. First, data from authoritarian governments show significantly less 
variation from a 7 day moving average. Because governments have no reason to add noise to 
data, lower deviation is evidence that data may be massaged. Second, data from authoritarian 
governments do not follow Benford’s law, which describes the distribution of leading digits of 
non-manipulated numbers. These discrepancies do not provide direct evidence that the lower 
burden on authoritarian governments is due to data manipulation. However, they do provide 
indirect evidence: these modifications likely have a purpose and a plausible reason is suppressing 
bad news. 
Ensuring the credibility of data isn’t a coronavirus specific concern. Data manipulation 
has been a perennial concern in public health and economics. There are notable instances of data 
fabrication in research 16, disease surveillance 17,18, and measurement of economic conditions 7-10.  
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There are many statistical methods for detecting fraud 16,19,20. Here we focus on two types 
of tests. One compares moments of the distribution of data across sites 19,21-23, specifically 
variance 16,19,20,22,24-26. The other looks at digit preference that deviates from Benford’s law 
19,20,27,28.  
 
Results  
Insufficient variation around moving average (Test 1). There is a strong positive 
association between fluctuations in the COVID-19 data reported by different countries and their 
“democratic-ness”. Figure 2 plots the natural logarithm of the mean of the squared deviation of 
daily cases and deaths per million people, respectively, from the 7 day moving average against 
the EIU’s overall democracy index score. Not only do authoritarian regimes report fewer cases 
and deaths, there seems to be more random variation in the data in more democratic nations. 
Aggregated data on Covd-19 across all countries in each of 4 regime categories provides 
further visual evidence that there is less variation in case data in authoritarian regimes. Figures 
S2a & S2b plots daily cases and deaths per million people around a 7-day centered moving 
average for those indicators, respectively, for each regime type. In addition to a lower rate of 
reported cases and deaths, there is almost no fluctuation in the data from authoritarian or hybrid 
regimes. Variation in the data appears to increase as one moves to a higher category of 
democratic-ness. 
Regression analysis (Table 1) suggest that each unit increase in the EIU Democracy score 
is associated with a 0.25 log point (95% Confidence Interval[CI]; 0.11-0.40) increase in the 
squared deviation of daily cases and 0.29 (95% CI; 0.19-0.39) increase in the squared deviation 
of daily deaths, respectively per million people. We obtain similar significant results when we 
use other democracy indices from Freedom House, Varieties of Democracy Index, and Polity5 
measures of political regimes.  
Although it is unlikely that features that affect the level of COVID-19 burden affect the 
variation in that burden, we estimate a version of the regression in Table 1 with controls for GDP 
per capita, health and trade as a percent of GDP, share of population over 65 and an indicator for 
countries above 40 degrees latitude. While greater democratic-ness is no longer associated with 
additional variability in cases, it continues to be associated with significantly greater variability 
in daily deaths per million people (Table S1). 
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Compliance with Benford’s law (Test 2). Figure 3 presents the results of our analysis 
for cumulative case and death data when our screening criteria is that growth in the 7 day 
centered moving average is greater than 7.5%. (Results for tests for other screening criteria are 
presented in Tables S2 are roughly consistent.) One cannot reject that Benford’s Law describes 
the distribution of first digits for cumulative cases for all regime types for p value less than 1%. 
However, one can reject the Benford’s law that describes the distribution of first digits for 
cumulative deaths at p value less than 1% for cumulative deaths for authoritarian regime, hybrid 
regimes, and flawed democracy, while it cannot be rejected for full democracies. 
Validation with ECDC data.  All of the analysis reported above were also conducted 
with data from the ECDC and the results are very similar.   
 
Discussion 
Analysis of compliance with Benford’s law suggests data from authoritarian regimes, 
hybrid regimes, and flawed democracy on cases comply but not for deaths, while for full 
democracies the data complies with Benford’s law, both for cases and deaths. Higher deaths may 
be more politically salient and, therefore, subject to manipulation. First, because the infection 
fatality rate of COVID-19 is close to 1%, cases are less consequential than COVID-19 deaths. 
Second, deaths better reflects state capacity than cases. Total cases are largely determined by 
transmissibility and infectiousness of the disease, and the total number of tests. Total deaths are 
influenced by, in addition to these factors, the health infrastructure, including availability of 
medical personnel and beds. Governments may be able credibly to blame low levels of testing on 
global shortages rather than government policy. Personnel and beds, however, require long term 
investments in medical education and construction. Therefore, a high death rate may imply the 
government has performed poorly for some time.  
This study has several limitations.  One is that, while we establish an association between 
data smoothening and government regimes, there may be potential confounders not included 
here that could alter the conclusions of the study. Second, no causal link has been established 
between government regimes and data smoothening. Third, the study does not present methods 
to obtain less biased estimates of cases. Comparison of multiple sources of information or 
indirect methods of measuring COVID-19, such as SARI cases or orders of caskets, are worth 
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exploring. A fourth limitation is that the paper presents two major methods of detecting 
manipulation. There are others, and these may reveal a greater degree of manipulation. 
The results here raise significant questions about the reliability of the data being reported 
by different countries and highlights the need for a degree of caution when making projections 
using such data. It may be appropriate to put in place systems for ongoing monitoring for fraud 
as are used for clinical trials 23,29-32. 
 
Materials and methods  
Data. Data on the type of regime in different countries come primarily from the 
Democracy Index 2019, by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)2. The EIU’s Democracy Index 
2019 includes data from expert assessments, public-opinion surveys (like the World Values 
Survey), voter turnout and the balance between the executive and legislative branches of 
government. The index has been used extensively in the literature as a measure of the state of 
democracy, in works examining anything from health services accessibility 33 to prosocial 
behavior 34 to trade 35.  The Index provides countries a score from 0 to 10 based on ratings across 
60 indicators across 5 topics (electoral processes and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of 
government, political participation, and political culture). Countries are classified as full 
democracies (scores > 8), flawed democracies (scores in (6, 8]), hybrid regimes (scores in (4,6]) 
and authoritarian regimes (scores ≤ 4). Given the arbitrary and discontinuous nature of the 
boundaries between these categories, we also directly use the numerical scores in our empirical 
analyses. We also employ data from other measures of democracy, such as Freedom House’s 
Democracy, the Varieties of Democracy Index, and the Polity5 of the polity project; these are 
described in the supplement. 
For validating results from the Democracy Index, we use three other sources.  The first is 
Freedom in the World 2020 from Freedom House 36, a rating of political rights and civil liberties 
in 195 countries and 15 territories.  Freedom in the World uses information from consultations, 
official records, and on-the-ground research conducted by external analysts, expert advisers and 
Freedom House staff.  The second source is data from Varieties of Democracy Institute 37 at the 
Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden.  The V-Dem Index 
aggregates information on more than 250 measures to rate countries between 0 and 1. The third 
source is the modified polity score from the Polity5 Project 38 by the Center for Systemic Peace 
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that codifies the characteristics of authority across countries in the world.  It ranges from -10 
(strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). 
Country-level data on COVID-19 cases and deaths, as well as country latitude, are from 
the 2019 Novel Coronavirus Data Repository at the Johns Hopkins University Center for 
Systems Science and Engineering1. JHU’s COVID repository aggregates information on cases 
and deaths from official and civil sources like the WHO, Center for Diseases Control and 
Prevention (CDC), media reports, local health departments and DXY, an online community for 
Chinese physicians and healthcare professionals. In this evolving situation, JHU’s data stream 
has emerged as one of the most reliable for academic research, modeling and policy decisions. 
For validating results from JHU data, we use data on cases and deaths from the European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).  The ECDC data are similar to JHU, except 
that they do not contain presumptive positive cases, defined as cases that have been confirmed by 
state or local labs, though not by national labs such as the CDC 39.   
We do not employ World Health Organization (WHO) data on COVID cases and deaths 
because of a change in the reporting time for WHO numbers on March 18, 2020 that makes it 
difficult to compare WHO number before and after that date.  Aggregate WHO data, on the one 
hand, and JHU and ECDC data, on the other, are very similar, with the exception of the period 
from February 12-16, 2020.  We choose to use ECDC data rather than WHO data to validate 
results using JHU data because of errors found in the WHO data 39. 
Country-level demographic and economic information (country–level per capita income, 
health and trade expenditure as a proportion of GDP, and the share of population over age 65) for 
the year 2017/2018 are drawn from the World Bank Open Database 40. Missing values were 
substituted with regional averages. 
We used data from the 165 independent states and two territories for which the EIU 
produced scores. This covered more than 99% of the world’s population. COVID-19 data was 
only available for 161 countries, Hong Kong was classified as part of China, and there was no 
data for Comoros, Lesotho, North Korea, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. These countries 
accounted for more than 99% of the total cases and deaths across the world.  
Data availability.  All the data used for this study are publically available and will be 
posted, along with code for all statistical analyses, will be posted in a Github repository by the 
corresponding author.   
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Insufficient variation around moving average (Test 1). One method of detecting data 
manipulation is to look for abnormal statistics (such as with the moments of the distribution) of 
the variable 19,21-23. It is difficult to identify abnormal means because one may not observe actual 
cases separately from the numbers reported by countries. A challenge for identifying abnormal 
variation in data is that there is no obvious baseline for normal variation. However, because the 
virus may not care about regime type, a comparison of variation across regime types may 
highlight abnormalities. In general, differences in variation across regime types cannot a priori 
distinguish whether one type suppressed variation or another type added variation. However, it is 
unlikely that higher variation is associated with manipulation, because countries gain little from 
adding variation to their data 16,19,20,22,24-26. By contrast, manipulating data can lead to reduced 
variation if care is not taken to reintroduce “normal” levels of variation 41. Therefore, we 
investigate whether authoritarian governments manipulate data by testing whether their COVID-
19 data is “smoothened” relative to democratic governments.  
To determine if the difference in data variation between authoritarian and democratic 
regimes is statistically significant, we employ regression analysis. Our dependent variable is a 
measure of variation in burden. We compose this variable in three steps. First, we calculate a 7 
day centered moving average in daily cases (deaths) for each day in each country. Second, we 
calculate the square of the deviation of the observed daily cases (deaths) around that moving 
average for each country. Third, we add one to the squared deviation and divide that by 
population (millions) and then take the natural logarithm. Our treatment variable is either the 
country’s score on the EIU’s Democracy Index, Freedom House’s Democracy, the Varieties of 
Democracy Index, or the Polity5 of the polity project. Our regressions also include a constant. 
While our observations are at the country day level, we cluster standard errors at the country 
level to account for autocorrelation in COVID-19 burden.  
Compliance with Benford’s law (Test 2). A second method of detecting data 
manipulation is to see if data follow patterns that are common in non-manipulated data. One such 
pattern is that the leading significant digits of a number (or mantissa) has a distribution such that 
Pr(mantissa < t/10) = log10 t for t in [1,10) 28. Also known as Benford’s Law, a wide assortment 
of data obey this law 42-45. Data have been checked against this distribution to test for fraud in 
accounting data 46, campaign contributions 47 and scientific data 48. We investigate whether 
governments manipulate data by testing whether the COVID-19 data on cumulative cases and 
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deaths across different regimes (authoritarian, hybrid, flawed democracy, and full democracy) 
confirms to Benford’s law.  
Before we can test COVID-19 case and death data against Benford’s Law, we must 
decide whether these data are appropriate to test against the law. A concern is that early during 
an epidemic and after infections plateau, the data will have a number of repeated numbers. These 
repeats may be the result of true case counts but still violate the law. Therefore, we look at 
portions of the time series of COVID-19 data during which cases and deaths are rising. 
Specifically, we test data (“screened data”) during which the growth rate of the 7 day moving 
average of cases and deaths is greater than some cutoff k, where k is 5%, 7.5%, and 10%.  
To implement the test, we look only at the first digit of the screened case and death data. 
According to Benford's law, Pr(first significant digit = d) = log10 (1+d-1), for d = 1,2,...,9. We 
group countries into the 4 regimes (authoritarian, hybrid, flawed democracy, and full democracy) 
defined by the EIU’s democracy index. Within each category, we compare the observed 
frequency of each digit d in the case data against the frequency predicted by Benford’s Law 
using a Pearson’s chi-squared test.  
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Tables and figures 
Figure 1 
Boxplot of total cases and deaths per million people of countries across 4 types of regime 
(authoritarian, hybrid, flawed democracy and full democracy). 
 
 
Notes. Regime classification is based on the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2019 Democracy Index. Case and death 
data are from Johns Hopkins University. Population data are from the World Bank Open Database. Upper (lower) 
hinge of the box is the 75th (25th) percentile. The black vertical line is the median and the yellow dot is the mean 
value. The black dots are the outliers.  
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Figure 2  
Natural logarithm of the Mean of squared deviations of observed daily cases and deaths per 
million people from a 7-day centered moving average, by EIU democracy index score. 
 
Daily cases 
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Daily deaths 
 
Notes. Case and deaths data are from Johns Hopkins University. The democracy index score is from the EIU’s 
Democracy Index. We compute the 7 day centered moving average of daily cases and deaths. We compute the 
square of daily deviations of the observed cases (deaths) from the 7 day centered moving average and add one to it. 
Then for each country we divide this daily deviation by population per million, compute the mean for each country, 
and take the natural logarithm. 
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Table 1 
Ordinary least squares regression of deviations from a moving average on measures of 
democracy. 
 
 Daily cases    
Measure of 
democracy 
EIU democracy 
score 
FH democracy 
score 
VD democracy 
score Polity5  
     
Democracy 0.25*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.12 
 (0.11 - 0.40) (0.08 - 0.32) (0.10 - 0.37) (-0.03 - 0.26) 
Constant 0.39 0.66 0.83** 0.96 
 (-0.54 - 1.32) (-0.15 - 1.48) (0.14 - 1.52) (-0.19 - 2.11) 
     
Observations 19,430 19,223 19,230 18,740 
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 
 Daily deaths    
Measure of 
democracy 
EIU democracy 
score 
FH democracy 
score 
VD democracy 
score Polity5  
     
Democracy 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.28*** 0.18*** 
 (0.19 - 0.39) (0.16 - 0.31) (0.19 - 0.36) (0.10 - 0.25) 
Constant -3.09*** -2.84*** -2.64*** -2.80*** 
 (-3.64 - -2.54) (-3.31 - -2.36) (-3.04 - -2.25) (-3.39 - -2.22) 
     
Observations 19,430 19,223 19,230 18,740 
R-squared 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.06 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 95% Confidence intervals are in parenthesis. The errors are clustered at the 
country level. Our unit of analysis is the “country-date”. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the squared 
deviation of the observed value from the 7 day centered moving average plus one per million people for each country 
on a daily basis, from the date when the first case was noted till June 30, 2020. Freedom House democracy score 
ranges from 0 to 100, to make it comparable to the EIU democracy score, the score is divided by 10. The VDEM score 
ranges from 0 to 1, to make it comparable to EIU democracy score, it is multiplied by 10. Similarly the modified 
polity5 score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic), therefore, to make it comparable we 
add 10 to the score and divide it by 2. 
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Figure 3 
Actual frequency of first significant digit in COVID-19 total cases and deaths during periods that 
7 day centered moving average grows faster than 7.5% daily, frequency predicted by Benford’s 
law, and test of the difference, by regime type. 
 
Total cases 
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Total deaths 
 
Notes: For each country, we only consider observations on total cases (deaths) on the date when the growth of the 7 
day centered moving average ≥ 7.5% The blue bars are the observed frequency of the digits. The red dotted line is 
the expected frequency according the Benford’s law. We compute the Pearson’s Chi square and the p Value. For 
significance level of .01, the critical value is 20.09. 
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Further evidence on excess burden in democracies 
 
Figure S1 
Total COVID cases, deaths per million people, and Case fatality ratio, by government regime, 
over time.  
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Further evidence on muted variation around moving average (test 1) 
Figure S2 
New daily cases and deaths per million people and 7-day moving average of the same, by 
government regime. 
 
Daily cases 
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Daily deaths 
 
 
Notes. Case and deaths data are from Johns Hopkins University.  New cases (deaths) are calculated by summing 
new cases (deaths) by day across all countries with a given regime type. Moving average is the 7 day centered 
moving average. 
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Table S1 
Ordinary least squares regression of deviations from a moving average on measures of 
democracy. 
 
Daily cases 
 
EIU democracy score 
FH democracy 
score 
VD democracy 
score Polity5 
Democracy score -0.01 0.04 -0.00 0.08 
 (-0.22 - 0.20) (-0.12 - 0.20) (-0.19 - 0.18) (-0.06 - 0.21) 
Per capita GDP 0.82*** 0.81*** 0.82*** 0.88*** 
 (0.54 - 1.11) (0.53 - 1.09) (0.54 - 1.11) (0.58 - 1.19) 
Trade as % of GDP -0.27 -0.29 -0.29 -0.32 
 (-1.01 - 0.48) (-1.05 - 0.48) (-1.03 - 0.45) (-1.08 - 0.43) 
Health as % of GDP 0.87** 0.81** 0.86** 0.74* 
 (0.09 - 1.65) (0.01 - 1.60) (0.06 - 1.67) (-0.05 - 1.54) 
Share of ≥65 years in pop -0.87** -0.96** -0.87** -1.13*** 
 (-1.61 - -0.13) (-1.70 - -0.22) (-1.58 - -0.16) (-1.91 - -0.35) 
Country ≥40o N latitude 0.85* 0.89* 0.87* 0.92* 
 (-0.14 - 1.83) (-0.09 - 1.86) (-0.11 - 1.85) (-0.12 - 1.95) 
Constant -4.32** -4.08** -4.25** -4.49** 
 (-7.74 - -0.89) (-7.60 - -0.56) (-7.78 - -0.72) (-8.03 - -0.95) 
N 19,430 19,223 19,230 18,740 
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
 
Daily deaths 
 
EIU democracy score 
FH democracy 
score 
VD democracy 
score Polity5 
Democracy score 0.16** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 
 (0.03 - 0.29) (0.06 - 0.25) (0.06 - 0.28) (0.07 - 0.29) 
Per capita GDP 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.44*** 
 (0.13 - 0.47) (0.15 - 0.48) (0.13 - 0.46) (0.26 - 0.61) 
Trade as % of GDP 0.57** 0.55** 0.56** 0.52** 
 (0.08 - 1.05) (0.06 - 1.04) (0.07 - 1.04) (0.05 - 0.99) 
Health as % of GDP 0.98*** 0.86*** 0.83*** 0.85*** 
 (0.50 - 1.46) (0.39 - 1.34) (0.36 - 1.30) (0.38 - 1.31) 
Share of ≥65 years in pop -0.58** -0.61*** -0.56*** -0.70*** 
 (-1.03 - -0.12) (-1.05 - -0.18) (-0.97 - -0.15) (-1.15 - -0.26) 
Country ≥40o N latitude 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.45 
 (-0.13 - 1.10) (-0.13 - 1.07) (-0.15 - 1.08) (-0.16 - 1.05) 
Constant -8.24*** -8.01*** -7.69*** -8.93*** 
 (-10.33 - -6.15) (-10.11 - -5.91) (-9.78 - -5.61) (-11.04 - -6.83) 
N 19,430 19,223 19,230 18,740 
R2 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 95% Confidence intervals are in parenthesis. The errors are clustered at the 
country level. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the squared deviation of the observed value from the 
7 day centered moving average plus one per million people for each country on a daily basis, from the date when the 
first case was noted till June 30, 2020. Freedom House democracy score ranges from 0 to 100, to make it comparable 
to the EIU democracy score, the score is divided by 10. The VDEM score ranges from 0 to 1, to make it comparable 
to EIU democracy score, it is multiplied by 10. Similarly the modified polity5 score ranges from -10 (strongly 
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic), therefore, to make it comparable we add 10 to the score and divide it by 2.  
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Further evidence on Benford’s Law (Test 2) 
Table S2 
Total cases 
 Growth rate = 5% Growth rate = 10% 
 Pearson Chi-square P Value Pearson Chi-square p Value 
Authoritarian regime 6.98 0.54 9.10 0.33 
Hybrid regime 9.31 0.32 15.84 0.04 
Flawed democracy 9.36 0.31 6.84 0.55 
Full democracy 6.60 0.58 5.15 0.74 
 
Total deaths 
 Growth rate = 5% Growth rate = 10% 
 Pearson Chi-square P Value Pearson Chi-square p Value 
Authoritarian regime 15.77 0.05 49.50 p < .01 
Hybrid regime 14.89 0.06 23.71 p < .01 
Flawed democracy 29.10 0.00 37.03 p < .01 
Full democracy 5.79 0.67 6.24 0.62 
 
 
 
